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Quantum key distribution (QKD) involving polarized photons could be vulnerable to a jamming
attack, in which a third party applies an external magnetic field to rotate the plane of polarization
of photons headed toward one of the two intended recipients. Sufficiently large Faraday rotation
of one of the polarized beams would prevent Alice and Bob from establishing a secure quantum
channel. We investigate requirements to induce such rotation both for free-space transmission and
for transmission via optical fiber, and find reasonable ranges of parameters in which a jamming
attack could be successful against fiber-based QKD, even for systems that implement automated
recalibration for polarization-frame alignment.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable technologies associated
with quantum entanglement is quantum encryption [1–
4]. In the popular Ekert91 protocol [5], a source creates
pairs of entangled particles; one member of each pair goes
to Alice and Bob, respectively. By performing measure-
ments at their respective stations on a series of entan-
gled particles and sharing some information on a clas-
sical channel about their choices of measurement bases
(but not sharing their measurement outcomes), Alice and
Bob can establish a quantum key with which to encrypt
and share messages. They can further establish the secu-
rity of their quantum channel by subjecting a subset of
their entangled particles to a Bell test, by measuring (for
example) the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt parameter S
[6].
In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has
advanced to robust, in-the-field demonstrations. Se-
cure quantum keys have been distributed using photons
through optical fibers as well as via free-space trans-
mission. Perhaps the most dramatic demonstrations to
date have involved quantum key distribution across thou-
sands of kilometers using the Micius satellite, launched
by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2016 and now
in low-Earth orbit at an average altitude of 500 km [7–
9]. Shorter-distance quantum key distribution is typi-
cally accomplished via networks of optical fibers, over
distances ranging from a few kilometers to hundreds of
kilometers [10].
In principle, the security of QKD derives from funda-
mental properties of quantum mechanics, such as entan-
glement, the uncertainty principle, and the no-cloning
theorem [1–4]. In practice, physicists and engineers have
identified a series of potential vulnerabilities that could
enable an adversary either to eavesdrop on a quantum
channel and gain information not intended for them, or
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to jam a quantum channel [2, 3, 11–14]. In a jamming (or
denial-of-service) attack, the intended recipients would
not be able to verify the security of the quantum chan-
nel and hence would refrain from using it to communi-
cate. Whereas the eavesdropping attacks that have been
identified to date typically require rather sophisticated
instrumentation and analysis, jamming attacks tend to
be more straightforward [3]. For example, by shining a
bright, classical light source toward Alice’s or Bob’s pho-
ton detectors, an adversary could saturate at least one of
their detectors; then Alice and Bob would not be able to
reliably measure the intended (QKD) photons in order to
establish a secure quantum key. (Such “blinding” attacks
can lead to further vulnerabilities; cf. Refs. [15, 16].)
In this paper we consider a different way that an adver-
sary could jam QKD. Our approach identifies a potential
vulnerability for QKD systems that use polarized pho-
tons. By applying an external magnetic field to some lim-
ited region of space through which the photons intended
for Alice (or Bob) must pass, an adversary could induce
a rotation of the photons’ polarization via the Faraday
effect. A sufficiently strong magnetic field would reduce
the degree of Bell violation that Alice and Bob would
measure, to the point that they would not be able to
verify that they shared a trustworthy quantum channel.
Hence they would not be able to establish a secure quan-
tum key. The same type of jamming attack would be
effective against other QKD protocols involving polar-
ized photons, such as variants of the BB84 protocol [17],
which do not involve explicit Bell-CHSH measurements,
since the Faraday rotation would increase the quantum
bit error rate (QBER).
In Section II, we briefly derive the effect that a rota-
tion of the plane of polarization of one of the polarized
photon beams would have on Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment of the CHSH parameter S, from which we may
evaluate the magnitude of a rotation angle α required for
a jamming attack. In Section III we consider applica-
tions of such a jamming attack to free-space QKD and
for distribution within optical fiber. As we will see, the
scenario we describe would not likely be effective against
free-space QKD involving polarized photons, but could
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2have a significant impact on systems that depend upon
optical fiber. Concluding remarks follow in Section IV.
II. BEAM ROTATION AND BELL TESTS
In order to confirm the security of a quantum channel,
Alice and Bob may perform a Bell test, using a portion of
the entangled photons that have been distributed from
the source. We assume that the source emits pairs of
polarization-entangled photons in a maximally entangled
state such as |Φ±〉 = {|H〉A ⊗ |H〉B ± |V 〉A ⊗ |V 〉B}/
√
2,
where subscripts A,B indicate photons directed toward
Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice and Bob can each
measure polarization in one of two bases, represented
by the spatial unit vectors a and a′ for Alice and b
and b′ for Bob; we label their measurement outcomes
A,B ∈ {+1,−1}. Then p(A = B|a,b) is the condi-
tional probability that Alice and Bob will obtain the same
measurement outcome given the joint settings (a,b), in
terms of which we may define the correlation function
E(a,b) = 2p(A = B|a,b) − 1. The CHSH parameter S
takes the form [6]
S ≡ |E(a,b)− E(a,b′) + E(a′,b) + E(a′,b′)|. (1)
Measurements on particles that are not entangled obey
the Bell-CHSH inequality, S ≤ 2, whereas measurements
on entangled particles may yield S > 2 [6]. In partic-
ular, the maximum violation of the Bell-CHSH inequal-
ity consistent with quantum mechanics is the Tsirelson
bound, Smax = 2
√
2 [18]. For measurements of po-
larized photons in the state |Φ±〉, quantum mechanics
predicts that the correlation functions should behave as
E(a,b)→ cos(2θab), where cos θab ≡ a ·b. If we assume
that the entangled photons travel along z and Alice and
Bob measure their polarizations within the x− y plane,
then the Tsirelson bound corresponds to the choice of
bases (a,a′) = (0◦, 45◦) and (b,b′) = (22.5◦, 67.5◦).
If Alice or Bob measure their photons in some rotated
basis, then the value of S that they measure will decrease
from its maximum value. Consider the case in which
Alice measures her photons in a basis rotated by an angle
α in the x−y plane: (a,a′)→ (a˜, a˜′) = (0◦+α, 45◦+α).
Then it is straightforward to demonstrate that the Bell-
CHSH violation for the state |Φ±〉 measured in the bases
(a˜, a˜′) and (b,b′) will shift to S → S˜, with
S˜ = S | cos(2α)|. (2)
The same shift S → S˜ will result if we keep Alice’s mea-
surement bases (a,a′) unchanged but rotate the plane
of polarization of the photons directed towards her by
an angle α. In that case |H〉A → |H˜〉A = cosα|H〉A +
sinα|V 〉A and |V 〉A → |V˜ 〉A = − sinα|H〉A + cosα|V 〉A,
and the entangled state shifts to |Φ±〉 → |Φ˜±〉 =
{|H˜〉A ⊗ |H〉B ± |V˜ 〉A ⊗ |V 〉B}/
√
2. Upon noting that
for the states |Ψ±〉 = {|H〉A ⊗ |V 〉B ± |V 〉A ⊗ |H〉B}/
√
2
the quantum-mechanical correlation function behaves as
E(a,b) = − cos(2θab), we again find the predicted shift
in the CHSH parameter as given in Eq. (2).
In a real test, Alice and Bob will typically measure
a value 2 < Smeas < 2
√
2. The visibility fraction
Smeas/2
√
2 will fall below one due to imperfections in
the state preparation, such that the photons that Alice
and Bob receive are not in a maximally entangled state;
misalignments of the bases from the ideal settings; finite-
aperture effects; limited detector efficiencies, and so on
[19]. Nonetheless, Alice and Bob can have confidence in
the security of their quantum channel if their measured
value Smeas ± σ (taking into account systematic errors,
quantified by the standard deviation σ) exceeds the Bell-
CHSH limit of 2 to high statistical significance.
If — unbeknownst to Alice — the polarization of her
photons has been rotated by a sufficiently large angle α
en route to her, after their emission from the source, then
she and Bob will not be able to verify with sufficient con-
fidence that they share a secure quantum channel. We
make the conservative assumption that the rotation of
the polarization of Alice’s photons does not increase the
systematic errors σ for Alice’s and Bob’s measurements
of S, since nothing has been done to affect the instrumen-
tation at either receiving station: both sides still operate
with the same detector efficiencies, dark count rates, and
the like. If we further assume that Alice and Bob perform
measurements on a sufficiently large sample of photons
that they may assume Gaussian statistics, then the effect
of the rotated polarization will be to shift the distribu-
tion of values Smeas that they are likely to find, with a
mean value closer to the Bell-CHSH limit of S = 2, as
shown in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1. Normalized probability density functions
f(Smeas|µ, σ2) for expected values to be measured of
the CHSH parameter S, assuming Gaussian statistics (with
mean µ and standard deviation σ). A rotation of the
polarization of the photons directed toward Alice will shift
the mean measured value of S toward lower values. In this
case, a rotation of the polarization of Alice’s photons by
α = 12.4◦ shifts the measured value Smeas = 2.37±0.09 (blue
curve) to S˜meas = 2.15 ± 0.09 (orange curve). Also shown
are the Bell-CHSH values S = 2 and the Tsirelson bound
S = 2
√
2. Because the correlation functions E(a,b) satisfy
|E(a,b)| ≤ 1, the maximum (algebraic) value for S is 4.
3In Fig. 1 we illustrate the effects of an induced shift
Smeas → S˜meas. In a recent experimental test of the
Bell-CHSH inequality using polarization-entangled pho-
tons from the satellite Micius, receiving stations on the
ground measured Smeas = 2.37 ± 0.09 [20]. If the po-
larization of Alice’s photons had been rotated by α =
0.216 rad = 12.4◦ en route, while all other details of the
experimental test remained unchanged, then from Eq. (2)
we would expect a shift Smeas → S˜meas = 2.15± 0.09. In
that case, what had originally been a violation of the
Bell-CHSH inequality by more than 4 standard devia-
tions would be reduced to a violation by just 1.7 standard
deviations. Assuming Gaussian statistics, this would cor-
respond to a shift in the probability with which Alice and
Bob would conclude that their quantum channel was in-
secure from p = 2.0 × 10−5 to p = 0.05. Given such a
relatively large p value in the latter case, Alice and Bob
would not be justified in trusting their quantum channel.
For other QKD protocols involving polarized photons,
such as the BB84 protocol and its variants [17], Alice
and Bob need not explicitly perform a Bell-CHSH test.
Nonetheless, such protocols would also be affected if, for
some reason, the plane of polarization of the photons
headed toward Alice were rotated by an angle α. In par-
ticular, such rotation would increase the quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER), potentially endangering the ability of
Alice and Bob to establish a secure quantum channel. In
this case, a photon in a particular quantum state, such as
|H˜〉A, would be misidentified by Alice’s detector as being
|V 〉A a fraction (1 − cos2 α) of times (and likewise |V˜ 〉A
for |H〉A). The additional QBER would be about 7.6%
for α = 0.279rad = 16.0◦. Given typical QBER for QKD
systems under nominal operating conditions of 2 − 3%
[14, 21, 22], the additional error rate induced by the ro-
tation angle α would push the total QBER too high for
reliable use.
III. JAMMING QKD SYSTEMS
How might an adversary (whom we designate “Jan-
ice”) jam Alice’s and Bob’s attempts to establish a se-
cure quantum channel, without alerting Alice or Bob to
her presence? If Janice could surreptitiously rotate the
plane of polarization of the photons heading toward Al-
ice by a large enough angle α, then she could jam Alice’s
and Bob’s quantum channel, without in any way affecting
Alice’s or Bob’s instrumentation (unlike other jamming
attacks, such as saturating Alice’s detector with a clas-
sical light source, which is readily detectable [3, 23]). To
accomplish such an attack, Janice could exploit Faraday
rotation.
Faraday rotation arises when an external magnetic
field is applied along the direction of propagation of
polarized light as the light travels through a dielectric
medium; under such circumstances, the plane of polar-
ization of the light will rotate by an angle β. For light
propagating a distance L through a uniform medium in
which a constant external field of strength B0 is applied,
the rotation angle β is given by [24]
β = VB0L, (3)
where V, the Verdet constant, depends on properties of
the medium as well as the wavelength of the light. The
Verdet constant may be parameterized as [24]
V = (n
2 − 1)2
n
2pi2c0
ρeλ2
, (4)
where n is the index of refraction for the medium (in the
absence of the external magnetic field), c is the speed of
light in vacuum, 0 is the vacuum permittivity, e is the
(absolute value of the) unit charge of an electron, ρ is
the number density of electrons within the medium, and
λ is the wavelength of the propagating light. (Note that
the index of refraction n also varies weakly with λ.) As
usual, we may evaluate the electron number density as
ρ = NA
∑
i
fiyi
µi
mi
, (5)
where NA is Avogadro’s number, fi is the fractional com-
position of the medium by constituent type i, yi is the
number of electrons per atom or molecule of constituent
type i, µi is the mass density (in g m
−3) of constituent i,
and mi is the molecular mass (in g mol
−1) for constituent
i. For example, the Earth’s atmosphere near sea level is
largely composed of N2 (f = 0.781), O2 (f = 0.210), and
Ar (f = 0.01), for which we find ρ = 3.7× 1026 m−3.
Polarized photons traveling through the Earth’s atmo-
sphere will undergo a weak rotation, due to the Earth’s
magnetic field. Given the varying density of the atmo-
sphere, one may effectively neglect such effects for alti-
tudes L > 4×104 m above sea level, and model the atmo-
sphere as a uniform medium with fixed electron number
density ρ ' 3.7 × 1026 m−3 for 0 ≤ L ≤ 4 × 104 m [25].
The Earth’s magnetic field strength is also (roughly) uni-
form across those altitudes, with B0 ' 5 × 10−5 T. For
photons of wavelength λ = 850 nm, the index of re-
fraction in air (at standard temperature and pressure)
is (n − 1) = 2.7477 × 10−4 [26]. Hence for the propaga-
tion of polarized photons with λ = 850 nm from space
to ground [20], we find Vair ' 3.7 × 10−4 rad T−1m−1
and β ' 7.4 × 10−4 rad ' 0.042◦, in close agreement
with the results for β/B0 calculated in Ref. [25]. Clearly
the Faraday effect arising from the Earth’s own mag-
netic field poses no threat to successful QKD involving
free-space transmission of polarized photons, including
space-to-ground transmission.
For Janice to exploit the Faraday effect to jam QKD
from free-space transmission of polarized photons, she
would need to apply an external magnetic field consider-
ably stronger than the Earth’s field. In order to produce
a rotation β ≥ α by means of the Faraday effect, Janice
would need to establish B0L ≥ (B0L)min, with
(B0L)min ≡ α/V. (6)
4We found in Section II that for distribution of
polarizaton-entangled photons as in Ref. [20], rotation
by an angle α = 0.216 rad = 12.4◦ could effectively jam
Alice’s and Bob’s efforts to establish a secure quantum
channel. For such free-space propagation, using Vair =
3.7 × 10−4 rad T−1 m−1, achieving a minimum rotation
angle α = 0.216rad would require (B0L)min = 594.6T m.
To date, the highest continuous magnetic field strength
produced by Earthbound instrumentation is B0 = 45 T,
achieved using a hybrid superconducting and resistive-
materials magnet weighing 35 tons and measuring 6.7m
high [27]. Presumably Janice could not install such in-
strumentation somewhere along the path of Alice’s pho-
tons without revealing her scheme. More typical field
strengths, with B0 ∼ O(1) T, are produced by tiny and
inexpensive objects, such as coin-sized neodymium-iron-
boron rare-earth magnets [28, 29]. In this case, the chal-
lenge for Janice would be to suspend an array of such
magnets over a considerable distance (∼ 0.5 km) along
the path of Alice’s photons. It therefore seems that QKD
involving free-space transmission of polarized photons —
including transmission from low-Earth orbit to ground
stations — is not in jeopardy of being jammed via in-
duced Faraday rotation.
On the other hand, most QKD systems in practice
will likely depend upon propagation through optical fiber
to connect networks within and between metropolitan
areas, ranging over distances from O(100 − 102) km
[10, 14, 21, 30]. Empirical measurements of the ef-
fective Verdet constant for typical, commercial optical
fiber for wavelengths ranging across the visible bands
into the near infrared may be parameterized as Vfiber =
a × 10−28 ν2 rad T−1m−1, with ν = c/λ the frequency
of light in Hz. Two sets of measurements found a =
0.159 ± 0.008 [31] and a = 0.142 ± 0.004 [32]. QKD
via optical fiber typically uses photons with λ = 1550
nm [21, 33–35]; adopting the lower (more conservative)
measurement of V from Ref. [32], this corresponds to
Vfiber = 0.53 rad T−1m−1. (We find a comparable esti-
mate for Vfiber if we use Eq. (4), naively assume pure
silicon dioxide for the core of the fiber, and take n = 1.44
for λ = 1550 nm within the fiber core.)
Given that the Verdet constant is three orders of mag-
nitude greater for optical fiber than for the atmosphere,
Janice’s jamming attack based on Faraday rotation can
be significantly more effective against QKD via optical
fiber. In fact, the authors of Ref. [33] found a weak but
measurable effect on fiber-based QKD involving polar-
ized photons arising simply from Faraday rotation from
the Earth’s weak magnetic field. If Janice were to apply a
stronger external field B0, she could achieve a sufficient
rotation angle α to disrupt Alice’s and Bob’s quantum
channel for B0L ≥ (B0L)min, with (B0L)min = α/Vfiber.
In Tables I and II we show the requirements for Jan-
ice’s jamming attack based on Bell-CHSH tests involv-
ing propagation of polarized photons with λ ' 1550
nm through optical fiber, both for table-top experiments
(across a distance d = 0 km) and for long-distance propa-
gation through fiber (across d = 20 km). As in Section II,
we assume that the Faraday rotation would not affect the
systematic errors reported in the original experiments,
and hence we calculate the shift Smeas ± σ → S˜meas ± σ,
with S˜meas related to Smeas by Eq. (2). We consider sce-
narios in which Alice and Bob stop trusting the security
of their quantum channel if they measure only modest vi-
olation of the Bell-CHSH inequality: either a violation by
only 1.7 standard deviations (corresponding to a proba-
bility that they were not measuring entangled particles of
p = 0.05); or the more stringent threshold of 2.5 standard
deviations (corresponding to p = 0.006). Each scenario
corresponds to a different minimum rotation angle α, and
hence, via Eq. (6), to a different value of (B0L)min.
Ref. d [km] Smeas σ S˜meas α [rad] (B0L)min [T m]
[34] 0 2.65 0.09 2.15 0.31 0.58
[34] 20 2.55 0.09 2.15 0.28 0.53
[35] 0 2.57 0.05 2.08 0.31 0.58
[35] 20 2.24 0.09 2.15 0.14 0.26
TABLE I. Minimum product of the field strength and path
length (B0L)min over which Janice would need to establish an
external magnetic field, if her goal were to reduce Alice’s and
Bob’s measured value of the CHSH parameter from Smeas±σ
to S˜meas±σ by inducing a rotation by angle α in the plane of
polarization of the photons directed toward Alice via optical
fiber. In this case, we assume that Alice and Bob set the
threshold for security of their quantum channel to be violation
of the Bell-CHSH inequality with p ≤ 0.05.
Ref. d [km] Smeas σ S˜meas α [rad] (B0L)min [T m]
[34] 0 2.65 0.09 2.23 0.29 0.55
[34] 20 2.55 0.09 2.23 0.25 0.47
[35] 0 2.57 0.05 2.13 0.30 0.57
[35] 20 2.24 0.09 2.23 0.05 0.09
TABLE II. Same as Table I, but for the case in which Al-
ice and Bob set the threshold for security of their quantum
channel to be violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality with
p ≤ 0.006.
The limiting case would be if Alice and Bob could
achieve Smeas = 2
√
2 with vanishing systematic error.
In that case, Janice would need to rotate the plane of
polarization of Alice’s photons by α = 0.39 rad = 22.5◦
in order to produce S˜meas = 2. For polarized photons
of λ = 1550 nm traveling through optical fiber with
Vfiber = 0.53 rad T−1 m−1, the limit case corresponds to
(B0L)min = 0.74 Tm. Like the values shown in Tables
I and II, with 0.09 ≤ (B0L)min ≤ 0.58, such a rota-
tion could be readily achieved by Janice using a small
number of inexpensive, coin-sized neodymium-iron-boron
magnets arranged within a region of space just a few cen-
timeters across.
In real implementations of QKD via optical fiber,
5transmission has been shown to remain stable over time-
scales of 1 - 2 hours [21, 22]. Nonetheless, recalibration
mechanisms must be employed, because tiny mechanical
or thermal disturbances to the fiber can lead to significant
induced birefringence, which in turn can push the polar-
ization bases out of alignment. Typically the recalibra-
tion consists of sending (unentangled) photons of known
polarization to Alice and/or Bob, who can then adjust
compensating wave plates at their detector stations to
realign the polarization bases. Polarization realignment
can now be implemented automatically, triggered (for ex-
ample) by a rise in QBER, and typically requires ∼ 5 s
[22]. Other active polarization-control methods — which
constantly monitor and adjust alignment rather than be-
ing triggered by a rise in QBER — have been able to
compensate for rapid changes in polarization basis with
scrambling frequencies up to 40pi rad s−1 [36, 37].
If Janice simply placed her magnets near the optical
fiber that directed photons toward Alice’s detectors and
left them there, then Alice and Bob could re-establish a
secure quantum channel by recalibrating their polariza-
tion bases; indeed, Alice and Bob probably would not
even suspect that Janice had tried to jam their chan-
nel. However, if Janice moved her magnets in some pat-
tern near the relevant optical fiber — thereby chang-
ing the applied external field over a time-scale shorter
than the time required to complete a polarization re-
alignment — then she could succeed in interrupting Al-
ice’s and Bob’s quantum channel indefinitely. For the
automated trigger-based realignment system of Ref. [22],
Janice would need to shift her applied field on time-
scales shorter than 5 s; for the continuous-adjustment
schemes described in Refs. [36, 37], Janice would need
to shift her applied field on time-scales shorter than
∼ 0.3 rad/(40pi rad s−1) = 0.002 s.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have identified a potential vulnerability of quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) using polarized photons. In
particular, an adversary (whom we dub Janice) could in-
duce a rotation of the plane of polarization of the light
headed toward Alice (or Bob) by applying a strong ex-
ternal magnetic field across a region of space through
which the photons traveled. The induced Faraday rota-
tion would prevent Alice and Bob from establishing a se-
cure quantum channel, either by lowering the measured
value of the Bell-CHSH parameter S with which they
would certify the security of their channel (as in the Ek-
ert91 protocol [5]), or, more generally, by increasing the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) above acceptable levels.
Such a jamming attack would not enable Janice to gain
secret information (as in eavesdropping attacks), though
it would enable her to disrupt Alice’s and Bob’s channel
indefinitely, without requiring access to either Alice’s or
Bob’s instrumentation, or even revealing her presence.
The magnitude of the Faraday effect depends sensi-
tively on the medium through which the photons prop-
agate. We find that such a jamming attack would likely
not be effective against free-space transmission of the
polarized photons (including space-based QKD as in
Ref. [7–9]), though it could be more readily effective
against QKD systems that depend upon transmission of
polarized photons through optical fiber. In particular,
given the sensitivity of optical fiber to mechanical dis-
turbances, installations of QKD fiber networks will likely
shield against direct mechanical interference, which could
impede Janice’s ability to intervene surreptitiously with
the fibers (for example, by blocking or cutting them).
Given cost considerations, however, it is unlikely that
tens or even hundreds of kilometers of optical fiber for
QKD will be protected by robust magnetic shielding.
Hence Janice could implement her jamming attack with-
out gaining direct, physical access to the fibers, while
remaining far away from either Alice’s or Bob’s receiving
stations.
Given the easy availability of inexpensive rare-earth,
coin-sized magnets with field strengths B0 ∼ O(1) T
(available at local hardware stores), Janice’s jamming
attack could be both inexpensive and inconspicuous. A
few such magnets arranged across a few centimeters (con-
cealed, say, within a backpack) and placed near an un-
guarded stretch of optical fiber could disrupt Alice’s and
Bob’s quantum channel. A simple mechanical construc-
tion within the backpack, which would rearrange the
magnets in space on an appropriately short time-scale
and thereby shift the direction and strength of the ap-
plied field in an unpredictable pattern, could spoil Alice’s
and Bob’s efforts to reestablish a secure channel via po-
larization realignment or recalibration.
The jamming attack we have identified here targets
QKD involving polarized photons. Whether compara-
ble attacks could be effective against other popular QKD
protocols involving photons, such as time-energy entan-
glement, remains the subject of further research.
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